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Abstract 
With the increasing scale and complexity of modern systems, traditional safety analysis methods such as FTA, 
FMEA seem inconvenient to use. Automated safety analysis based on formal models has become popular. In this 
paper, we took the Altarica data-flow language as the research object, and specified how to extract failure logic 
relations from Altarica component models and system models to generate fault trees (FTs), and proved its validity 
through instance verification. Fault tree generation method proposed in this paper would provide a basis for the 
development of automated safety analysis tools based on Altarica. 
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1. Introduction 
With constant improvement of modern technology, aircraft systems and equipment become more 
complex, and system safety has drawn more attention. As a classical safety analysis method, FTA is 
widely used in different areas. However, traditional fault trees are established by analysts based on 
experience, which means that the fault trees could hardly reflect the real designs; Moreover, as to complex 
systems, fault trees would be extremely huge and it becomes impossible to generate and modify them by 
manual [1]. 
Automatic fault tree generation from formal models (such as Altarica models, Nu-SMV models) seems 
an efficient way to solve the problems above [2][3]. Formal models are usually built through the real 
system structures and functions, for example, Altarica could reflect the failure logic information of 
systems. Therefore, fault trees automated generated from formal models fit the real system designs more; 
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Meanwhile, formal models are easy to modify and maintain, which makes it easy to modify fault trees as 
well. Fault trees generation methods through the traditional way and formal models are described in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1 Fault trees generation through traditional way and formal models 
Mode automata, the underlying formalism of Altarica could be translated into fault trees [4]. However, 
there are no relevant researches on how to translate the high level language, Altarica data-flow, into fault 
trees, which would be a much easier way to generate fault trees. In this paper, we studied on how to 
extract failure logic information from Altarica data-flow models and proposed the fault tree generation 
method from the Altarica data-flow language, which would provide a good basis for the development of 
automated safety analysis tools based on Altarica. This paper is organized as follows: First, the context of 
this study is introduced in Chapter 1; then, fundamental principles are described in Chapter 2; fault tree 
generation method based on Altarica data-flow is described in Chapter 3; finally, the validity of methods 
proposed in this paper is verified in Chapter 4. 
2. Fundamental principles 
Altarica models on failure logic [1], which means that Altarica could explicitly describe the 
propagation of the effects of failure modes. In this chapter, failure logic modeling approach is introduced 
first, and then the basic concepts of Altarica are described. 
2.1. Failure logic modeling 
The failure logic modeling (FLM) approach emerged in the 1990s. FLM comes from traditional safety 
analysis method such as FTA and FMEAˈbut it overcomes the problems of great difficulty to modify , 
reuse and application to large systems. A component’s failure logic describes how deviations of 
component inputs (input failure modes) combine with each other and with internal abnormal phenomena 
(internal failures) to cause particular deviations of behavior of component outputs (output failure 
modes).The system’s FL are composed from the FL of individual components [5]. Altarica models belong 
to FLM as well as FPTN[6]ǃFPTC[7]ǃHip-Hops[8],etc. 
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Fig. 2 Simplified FPTN graph 
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FPTN is a graphical notation of failure logic. Even Though FPTN is not a formal method, it could 
describe failure logic very directly and clearly though its graphical languages [6]. FPTN is simplified in 
this paper as shown in Fig. 2 (only generic characters kept). Modules are represented by a box. Variables 
on the left of the box in Fig 2 stand for input failure modes (i.e. A and B), and variables on the right are 
output failure modes (i.e. X). Internal failure modes (i.e. C) and relations between input, internal and 
output failure modes are describe inside the box. 
According to connectives in the design models, a failure logic model of the system can be composed 
from the characterizations of individual components by connecting output failure modes of the component 
to input failure modes of other components, as shown in Fig. 3. Boxes in FPTN can be seen a set of fault 
trees. Causes of output failure modes (such as Z in Fig. 3) can be deduced through the FPTN graphs and 
fault trees could be built in that way. 
FRPS
$
%
FRPS
FRPS;
=<
 
Fig. 3 FPTN notion of a System 
2.2. Altarica Model 
Altarica is a formal language developed by the computer science laboratory of Bordeaux jointly with 
industries partners [9], and has been widely used in the aviation areas. In the Altarica models, systems are 
described by a set of nodes. A node is a hierarchical description, which could be composed of sub-nodes. 
Nodes that contain no sub-nodes could be used to represent a component which cannot be decomposed. 
Nodes containing sub-nodes could represent a system. The way to describe component nodes and system 
nodes is introduced as follows [10] [11]. 
2.2.1. Component node 
Each component node is defined by three well identified parts. First part is the declaration of different 
kinds of node parameters which are state, flow and event. States are internal variables that memorize 
current functioning modes (failure modes or normal ones). Flows are node inputs or outputs. Events are 
phenomena that could trigger transitions of states. Pilot actions, the occurrence of failures, or 
deterministic reactions to input conditions all could be seen as events. 
The second part describes the automaton transitions. First of all, the values of initial states are assigned 
in the init clause. Then, the transition is described by a tuple like “g| − evt− > e” where g is the guard of 
the transition, evt is an event name and e is the effect of the transition. The guard is a Boolean formula 
over states or flows variables. It defines the configuration in which the transition is fireable if the event evt 
occurs. The effect e is a list of assignations of value to state variables. So the transition part describes how 
functioning or failure states can evolve. Finally, the distributions of event durations are described in the 
clause extern of nodes. 
The third part is a set of assertions described in the “assert” clause. Assertions are atomic equalities or 
more structured equations using case constructions. They establish invariant relations between the states 
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and the flows of the component and so, describe how component outputs are determined by component 
inputs and current functioning mode. 
Take the valve in Fig. 4 as an example to show how a component node could be described. Assume 
that the valve can be either open or closed and that it may be stuck, either open or closed. The valve 
changes from open to closed (resp. from close to open) if it is not stuck and the event close (resp. open) 
occurs. The valve gets stuck when the event fail occurs. If the valve is open, its output flow equals its 
input flow. Otherwise, its output flow is null. 
 
Fig. 4 a valve and its mode automaton 
The valve can be described as a Altarica component node as shown in Fig. 5. States, 
inputs and outputs and triggers of the valve are respectively declared in the state, flow and event 
clause. The init clause and trans clause respectively declare the initial stare and state transition 
mechanisms. The assert clause describes the outputs of the valve in different modes. 
 
Fig. 5 component declaration of a valve node 
2.2.2. System node 
System nodes can be decomposed into component nodes or system nodes in a lower level. When 
describing a system, component nodes which compose the system, should be described first. Then, a 
higher level node that can be called as a system node is used to describe the composition of this system, 
the flow coordination among different component nodes and the synchronization of events.  
A system node is shown in Fig. 6. Assume that the system is composed of three components: a valve, a 
pump and an operator. The system has an input flow connected to the input flow of the valve. The output 
flow of the valve is connected to the input flow of the pump. The output of the flow is connected to the 
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output flow of the system. The operator can be seen as an independent component that contains two 
events: open Valve and close Valve. The opening and closing of the valve are synchronized with the 
corresponding actions of the operator. As shown in Fig. 6, the composition, the flow coordination and the 
synchronization of events are separately described in the sub clause, the assert clause and the sync clause.  
 
 
Fig. 6 Declaration of a system node 
3. Fault tree generation from altarica models 
Altarica has a full description the failure logic, and the fault tree is the abstraction of the failure logic 
[5]. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a failure logic first and then compare the Altarica model and the 
fault tree formed by the same failure logic to determine the fault-tree generation method from Altarica 
models. The research idea of the fault-tree generation method is shown in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7 research idea of fault-tree generation from Altarica 
In this chapter, a single failure logic is established first which is represented by the simplified FPTN 
graph. Then, the Altarica model built according to the failure logic is declared as well as the fault tree 
generated by manual. Finally, the Altarica model and the corresponding fault tree are compared to specify 
the generation method. Since Altarica owns a different way to declare component nodes and the 
decomposable system nodes, the generation research is separated into two parts: the component nodes and 
the system nodes. 
3.1. Fault tree generation from component nodes 
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The failure logic of a component named comp1 is shown in Fig. 8. According to the Fig., comp1 has 
two input failure modes: A and B (all failure modes have two values like normal and failed to simplify 
description), and one output failure mode X. Meanwhile, comp1 owns internal failure mode C. When A 
and B both occur (which means that A and B are assigned with the value failed, i.e., A.failed and B.failed), 
or C occurs, comp1 would output X (i.e., X is assigned with failed) to other components.  
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Fig. 8 Failure Logic Characters of comp1 
1) Altarica Model 
As to comp1, the failure logic can be described by the Altarica model as follows: 
node comp1 
  flow 
    A : default_nominal_failed : in; 
    B : default_nominal_failed : in; 
    X : default_nominal_failed : out; 
  state 
    C : {nominal,failed} ; 
  event 
    fail_C_nominal_failed; 
  init 
    C := nominal; 
  trans 
    ((C = nominal)) |- fail_C_nominal_failed -> C := failed; 
  assert 
    X = if ((((A=failed) and (B=failed)) or (C=failed))) then failed else nominal; 
edon 
In the Altarica model, the input failure modes (A and B) and output failure mode(C) are declared by 
the input and output variables in the flow clause. The internal failure mode C is declared by the state 
variables in the state clause. The event clause declares the events that trigger changes of states. The 
mechanism of state transition is described in the trans clause. The login relations among output failure 
modes, input failure modes and internal failure modes are declared in the assert clause. 
2) Fault tree 
Choose X.failed as the top event, and the whole fault tree could be deduced and abstracted from Fig. 8 
as follows: 
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Fig. 9  Fault Tree translated by FLM of comp1 
According to Fig. 9, input failure modes and (or) internal failure modes of components form the 
bottom events. 
3) Fault tree generation method from component nodes 
Comparing the Altarica model and the fault tree( in Fig. 9), we can see that the top event of fault trees 
could be determined by the output variables in the flow clause of Altarica modelsˈand that bottom events 
are determined by the relevant input variables and state variablesˈand that the logic gates are determined 
by the assert clause. The fault tree generation method from component nodes can be described as follows: 
x Set the top event. The top event is determined by the output variables in the flow clause of a 
component node. Assigning any output variable an exceptional value could specify a top event.  
x Determine the corresponding bottom events. As to the component nodes, when assigned with 
exceptional values, the input variables in the flow clause and state variables in the state clause form the 
bottom events According to the assertions relevant to the top event in the assert clause, the bottom 
events corresponding with the top event could be determined. 
x Determine the logic gates. The logic relations between the top events and bottom events are described 
by the assert clause. And the AND, OR, and VOTING gate correspond to the connective word and, or 
and the phrase rn(). 
Table 1 shows the corresponding relations between fault trees and component nodes of Altarica. 
Table 1 corresponding relations between fault trees and component nodes 
Fault Tree 
Composition 
Corresponding description by component nodes of Altarica 
Corresponding variable Corresponding value Corresponding clause 
Top Event Output variables Exceptional value Flow 
Bottom Event Input variable 
state variable Exceptional value 
Flow 
State 
Logic gate —— —— Assert 
3.2.  Fault tree generation from system nodes 
System nodes are nodes that are decomposable, and usually composed of component nodes or system 
nodes in lower levels. Assume that the system named System1 is composed of three component nodes: 
comp1 (in Fig. 8), comp2, and comp3. The FLM of comp2 and comp3 is shown in Fig. 10. 
 
147 Shaojun Li and Xiaoxun Li /  Procedia Engineering  80 ( 2014 )  140 – 152 
FRPS
% <Y == % AND D
 GENERATED D
from INTERNAL  
FRPS
;
=Z == ; OR Y 
<
 
Fig. 10 FLM of comp2 and comp3 
Connect the output failure modes and input failure modes of comp1,comp2 and comp3, and the internal 
FLM of System1 can be established as shown in Fig. 11.  
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Fig. 11 Internal FLM of System1 
1) Altarica Model 
The failure logic of system nodes is described in a hierarchical way in Altairca. First, the failure logic 
of comp1, comp2 and comp3 are declared separately. Then, input and output failure modes of the system 
are declared by the variables in the flow clause of the System1 node. Third, the system’s composition is 
described in the sub clause of the System1 node. Finally, the flow coordination including connections 
among internal components and the connections between the system’s input (or output) and the internal 
component. The failure logic of System1 could be described in Altarica as follows. 
 
node comp1 
flow 
…… 
state 
…… 
edon 
node comp2 
flow 
…… 
edon 
node comp3 
flow 
…… 
state 
…… 
edon 
node System1 
 flow 
   A : default_nominal_failed : in; 
B : default_nominal_failed : in; 
Z : default_nominal_failed : out; 
sub 
comp1 : comp1; 
comp2 : comp2; 
comp3 : comp3; 
assert 
  comp1.A = A,  comp1.B = B, 
  comp2.B = B,  Z = comp3.Z, 
comp3.i = comp1.X, 
 comp3.i2 = comp2.Y; 
edon 
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2) Fault Tree 
According to the failure logic of System1, take the Z.failed as the top event, and the fault tree can be 
generated as shown in Fig. 12. According to Fig. 12, the bottom events of System1 are composed of the 
system’s input failure modes and (or) internal failure modes. Usually, each output failure mode of the 
system can be set as a top event. 
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Fig. 12 Fault Tree generated from the FLM of System1 
3) Fault Tree Generation Method From System Nodes 
Compare the Altarica model and the fault tree in Fig. 12, and the correspondence can be seen that the 
top event of the fault tree is set when an output variable in the flow clause of the system node is assigned 
with an exceptional value; the bottom events are composed of the external input variables and (or) the 
internal state variables of the system node when they are assigned with exceptional values. 
The fault-tree generation process from a system node is shown in Fig.13 as well as the node and clause 
relied on during the process. The detailed process is as follows:  
˄a˅ Specify the top event and relevant internal component. Choose an output variable from the flow 
clause of the system node, and assign it with an exceptional value, then a top event is specified 
Determine the corresponding internal component of the output variable t according to the assert clause 
of the system node. 
˄b˅ Build the first-level fault tree. Build the first-level fault tree by the fault-tree generation method 
from a component node as detailed in 3.1. The component is determined in Step (a). 
˄c˅ Judge if the bottom events of the first-level fault tree are decomposable. The bottom event could 
not be decomposable if it corresponds to the state variable according to the flow and state clause in the 
component node. If it corresponds to input variables (defined as VIN), there exists two conditions: 
i. If VIN  is connected to the input variable of the system(i.e., there exists a sentence VIN=V in the 
assert clause of the system node, and V is the input variable of the system defined in the flow 
clause of the system node), then this bottom event should stop further decomposition and be 
replaced by the input variable of the system assigned with an exceptional value. 
ii. If VIN  is connected to the output variable of other components(i.e., in the assert clause of the 
system node, there exists a sentence comp.VO=VIN, and comp stands for an internal component), 
this bottom event could be further decomposed as the following steps. 
˄d˅ Determine the top event of the second-level fault tree. According to the Step (c), assign an 
exceptional value to the output variable corresponding to the decomposable bottom event (i.e. comp.VO), 
and take the output variable with an exceptional value as the second-level top event. 
˄e˅ Build the second-level fault tree. Build the second-level fault tree for the second-level top event 
from its corresponding component node by the method in 3.1. 
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˄f˅ Repeat Step (c) until all the bottom events corresponding to the external input variables and 
internal state variables of the system. 
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Fig. 13 System-FT generation process and corresponding node and clause in Altarica 
4. Case verification 
The fault-tree generation method proposed in this paper is verified in this chapter. The verification idea 
is shown in Fig. 14. First, specify a single failure logic and use the Altarica model to describe it. Then, 
generate the fault tree from the Alratica model according to the method proposed in this paper, At last, 
verify the consistency between the fault trees generated from Altarica and the one generated directly from 
the failure logic. If they are consistent, the efficiency of the method proposed could be verified.  
Failure Logic
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Fault Tree
described by ?
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method proposed in
this paper
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&RQVLVWHQF\
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Fig. 14 Verification idea 
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4.1. Failure logic 
Build failure logic of a system named System2 as shown in Fig. 15. System2 contains three components. 
And the input failure mode of System2 is A; the output failure mode is Z. B, C, D are internal failure 
modes of the three components. The fault tree could be abstracted as shown in Fig. 15. 
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(a) Failure logic of System2 
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(b) FT generated from failure logic of System2 
Fig. 15 Failure logic of System2 and its corresponding fault tree 
4.2. Altarica model 
According to the failure logic in Fig. 15, the Altarica model of System2 could be built as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 16 Altarica data flow model  
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4.3. Fault tree generated from the Altarica model 
According to the Altarica model in 4.2, there exists only one output variable, i.e. Z in the flow clause of 
the System node. Set Z.failed as the top event, and it’s the output of comp3 judging by the sentence Z= 
comp3.Z in the assert clause of the System node. The first level fault tree could be built as follows: 
Z.failed
U.failed W.failed  
(a) the first-level FT 
Z.failed
W.failed U.failed
V.failed C.failed  
(b) the second-level FT 
Fig. 17 the FT of first level and second level 
There are two bottom events in the first-level fault tree: U.failed and W.failed. According to the assert 
clause of the System node, U and W are the output of compone1 and component2 (judging by the 
sentences: comp3.W = comp2.W, comp3.U = comp1.U). Therefore, U.failed and W.failed could be further 
decomposed and be used to build the second-level fault tree as shown in Fig. 16. C is a state variable, so 
C.failed couldn’t be decomposed. V is the output of comp1, so V.failed decomposable. Finally, according 
to the fault-tree generation method proposed in 3.2, the whole fault tree could be established as follows: 
 
Z.failed
W.failed U.failed
V.failed C.failed
A.failed X.failed
C.failed
Y.failed
A.failed B.failed
D.failed
 
Fig. 18 The fault tree generated from Altarica 
4.4. Consistency verification  
Compare the fault tree generated from Altarica in Fig. 17 and FT directly from FLM in Fig. 15, and the 
conclusion could be drawn that those two fault trees are consistent, which means that the fault-tree 
generation method from Altarica proposed in this paper is correct. 
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5. Conclusion 
The FT generation method from Altarica model proposed in this paper could be used to abstract failure 
logic information from Altarica models and generate the correct fault trees. This method take a basis for 
develop automatic fault-tree generation tools. In later researches, we will also study on the graphical 
notation of Altarica and translating it into Altarica data-flow languages as well as automatic fault tree 
generation in order to build the integrated platform for Altarica modeling and analysis. 
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